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Summary
Background Health-care workers have been implicated in nosocomial outbreaks of Staphylococcus aureus, but the 
dearth of evidence from non-outbreak situations means that routine health-care worker screening and S aureus 
eradication are controversial. We aimed to determine how often S aureus is transmitted from health-care workers or 
the environment to patients in an intensive care unit (ICU) and a high-dependency unit (HDU) where standard 
infection control measures were in place.
Methods In this longitudinal cohort study, we systematically sampled health-care workers, the environment, and 
patients over 14 months at the ICU and HDU of the Royal Sussex County Hospital, Brighton, England. Nasal swabs 
were taken from health-care workers every 4 weeks, bed spaces were sampled monthly, and screening swabs were 
obtained from patients at admission to the ICU or HDU, weekly thereafter, and at discharge. Isolates were cultured 
and their whole genome sequenced, and we used the threshold of 40 single-nucleotide variants (SNVs) or fewer to 
deﬁ ne subtypes and infer recent transmission. 
Findings Between Oct 31, 2011, and Dec 23, 2012, we sampled 198 health-care workers, 40 environmental locations, 
and 1854 patients; 1819 isolates were sequenced. Median nasal carriage rate of S aureus in health-care workers at 
4-weekly timepoints was 36·9% (IQR 35·7–37·3), and 115 (58%) health-care workers had S aureus detected at least 
once during the study. S aureus was identiﬁ ed in 8–50% of environmental samples. 605 genetically distinct subtypes 
were identiﬁ ed (median SNV diﬀ erence 273, IQR 162–399) at a rate of 38 (IQR 34–42) per 4-weekly cycle. Only 
25 instances of transmission to patients (seven from health-care workers, two from the environment, and 16 from 
other patients) were detected.
Interpretation In the presence of standard infection control measures, health-care workers were infrequently sources 
of transmission to patients. S aureus epidemiology in the ICU and HDU is characterised by continuous ingress of 
distinct subtypes rather than transmission of genetically related strains.
Funding UK Medical Research Council, Wellcome Trust, Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council, UK 
National Institute for Health Research, and Public Health England.
Copyright © The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY license.
Introduction
Staphylococcus aureus is a common commensal bacterium 
but also a leading cause of health-care-associated infec-
tion. Colonisation usually precedes infection, and the risk 
of invasive disease is greatest immediately after 
acquisition of a new strain.1,2 S aureus is transmissible 
between patients, particularly in high-dependency 
settings.3–6 Hospitals invest con siderable eﬀ orts in pre-
vention of direct patient-to-patient transmission or 
transmission via staﬀ  and the environment.7 Even with 
good infection control practice, transmission still occurs.8 
Colonised health-care workers have been implicated as 
sources of transmission in outbreaks,9–11 but the use of 
health-care worker screening and S aureus eradication as 
routine control measures is controversial.
In this study, we aimed to determine how often S aureus is 
transmitted from health-care workers or the environment to 
patients in a non-outbreak situation, using whole-genome 
sequencing to establish genetic relatedness and infer recent 
transmission. 
Methods
Study design and participants
In this longitudinal cohort study, we sampled 
health-care workers, the environment, and patients at 
the adult intensive care unit (ICU) and high-dependency 
unit (HDU) of the Royal Sussex County Hospital, a 
large acute hospital in Brighton, England. Since the 
rate of transmission between groups was unknown, we 
conducted the study for 14 months (from Oct 31, 2011, 
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to Dec 23, 2012) and did not prespecify ﬁ xed sample 
sizes. The ICU has one ﬁ ve-bedded area, one four-
bedded area, three double side-rooms, and one single 
side-room. The HDU, two ﬂ oors below the ICU, has 
two four-bedded areas, one two-bedded area (opened in 
April, 2012), and two single side-rooms. During the 
study, infection control practice followed UK National 
Health Service Guidelines (panel).12
In this study, patient sampling and data collection 
without individual consent were approved by the 
Research Ethics Committee (10/H0505/83) and Health 
Research Authority (ECC 8-05 (e)/2010), and screening 
and data collection of health-care workers were approved 
by the Research Ethics Committee (11/LO/1451). All 
health-care workers provided written informed consent.
Procedures
We invited all nurses, doctors, and physiotherapists with 
direct patient contact in the ICU or HDU, including 
temporary staﬀ , to participate in the study. Following 
successful recruitment of nurses from Oct 31, 2011, 
doctors and physiotherapists were additionally recruited 
from April 16, 2012. Nasal swabs were taken from 
participating health-care workers every 4 weeks (give or 
take 1 week). Demographic characteristics, co morbidities, 
and risk factors for S aureus carriage were collected 
through anonymised questionnaires com pleted with 
each sample (see appendix for anonymisation details). 
Separate consent was sought for three substudies 
investigating transient carriage (nasal swabbing before 
and after shifts during 2 working days), multiple 
anatomical site carriage (additional swabs from the 
throat, axillae, groin, and any broken skin), and throat 
carriage (additional throat swabs every 6 months).
We sampled each bed space monthly by swabbing three 
sites of frequent staﬀ  contact (monitor button, wipe-clean 
keyboard, and disposable curtain) and two less accessible 
sites (ﬂ oor behind bed and underside of bed). The blood 
gas machine in a central utility room was swabbed 
monthly. Air samples were taken from ten sites monthly 
(plus an additional site from month 6 for two newly opened 
HDU bed spaces) with an intake of 100 L/min and an 
impact speed of less than 20 m/s (airIDEAL, Biomerieux, 
Marcy-l’Étoile, France), as recommended by the Inter-
national Organization for Standardization.13 Monthly 
environmental sampling by the research team followed 
clinical rounds (mid-morning) to minimise eﬀ ect on 
clinical duties. Patients were present in bed spaces during 
sampling. Disposable curtains were changed after patient 
discharge but not immediately before sampling. Clinical 
areas were cleaned continuously, but study sites were not 
cleaned immediately before sampling.
As per routine clinical practice, nasal swabs were 
obtained from all patients at admission to the ICU or 
HDU (usually within 24 h), weekly thereafter, and at 
discharge. Perineal swabs were also taken for most 
patients. All available screening swabs were included in 
the study and cultured for meticillin-resistant S aureus 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
We searched PubMed from April 1, 2001, to Sept 1, 2016, for 
studies published in any language using the terms 
“Staphylococcus aureus”, “MRSA”, “healthcare worker or staﬀ ”, 
“transmission”, “whole-genome sequencing”, and “molecular 
epidemiology”. We found two published reports documenting 
the use of whole-genome sequencing and describing the 
involvement of health-care workers in S aureus outbreaks. The 
ﬁ rst report implicated a health-care worker in a persistent 
meticillin-resistant S aureus (MRSA) outbreak in a neonatal 
intensive care unit (ICU). In the second study, the investigators 
characterised two outbreaks of meticillin-susceptible S aureus 
(MSSA) in separate neonatal ICUs and identiﬁ ed a health-care 
worker who was colonised with highly related strains during 
each outbreak. Most published reports of S aureus 
transmission in health-care settings focus on MRSA and the 
investigation of outbreaks. To our knowledge, no prospective, 
whole-genome sequencing-based studies of nosocomial 
carriage and transmission of S aureus in the endemic setting 
have been done.
Added value of this study
In this study, we systematically sampled health-care workers, 
the environment, and patients in a critical care unit over 
14 months and used whole-genome sequencing to characterise 
all available isolates of S aureus, thus providing a comprehensive 
description of colonisation and transmission. Quite 
unexpectedly, we found continuous ingress of genetically 
diverse S aureus strains with little onward transmission, despite 
high rates of carriage by health-care workers and patients, and 
in the environment.
Implications of all the available evidence
In settings where good infection control practice is in place, 
additional measures to prevent S aureus transmission are unlikely 
to reduce infection rates. Many acquisitions might be attributable 
to recrudescence of cryptic carriage and should not be routinely 
ascribed to transmission and breached infection control. We 
present methods that are of value to those involved in the 
development and use of methods based on whole-genome 
sequencing to investigate S aureus colonisation and transmission.  
The possibility that patients experience recrudescence of cryptic 
S aureus carriage requires further investigation to understand its 
mechanism and develop strategies to identify and protect 
patients from invasive disease.
See Online for appendix
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(MRSA) and meticillin-susceptible S aureus (MSSA). All 
patients admitted to the ICU or HDU were eligible and 
included if they were screened. Additionally, to optimise 
detection of transmission to patients, from March 1, 2012, 
sputum, respiratory, urine, wound, and blood culture 
samples taken for diagnostic purposes yielding S aureus 
were included. Anonymised data regarding the patient, 
hospital stay, and ICU or HDU bed stay were collected 
from patient records and ICU or HDU routine screen 
results from the laboratory database.
All isolates were cultured with SaSelect (Oxoid, 
Basingstoke, UK) and MRSAselect chromogenic agar 
plates (Bio-Rad, Redmond, WA, USA). Since the 
nosocomial population structure of S aureus comprises a 
small number of lineages within which closely related 
strains cannot be reliably distinguished by conventional 
molecular typing techniques,8 we used whole-genome 
sequencing (Illumina HiSeq2500, Illumina Inc, San 
Diego, CA, USA) to establish genetic relatedness of study 
isolates (appendix). To enhance detection of S aureus, 
swabs from health-care workers and environmental 
samples underwent broth enrichment. 
Statistical analysis
All analyses were done at the level of S aureus subtype, 
which was used to infer compatibility with involvement 
in recent direct or indirect transmission.8,14 Isolates were 
deﬁ ned to be of the same subtype if they diﬀ ered by no 
more than 40 single-nucleotide variants (SNVs), equating 
to roughly 5 years of evolution. To assess diversity of 
isolates, we calculated the median and maximum SNV 
diﬀ erences seen within individual health-care workers 
across diﬀ erent combinations of sampling sites and time, 
and the minimum SNV diﬀ erences seen between health-
care workers across the whole study. S aureus acquisition 
was deﬁ ned by a culture-negative screen followed by 
a culture-positive screen or diagnostic sample, or by a 
culture-positive sample followed by a culture-positive 
sample of a diﬀ erent subtype. Transmission from 
health-care worker to patient was deﬁ ned as patient 
acquisition of a subtype cultured from a health-care 
worker either at the same time or at any previous 
timepoint in the study. Patient-to-patient transmission 
was deﬁ ned as patient acquisition of a subtype cultured 
from a previous patient, irrespective of whether they 
shared time in the ICU or HDU. Transient health-care 
worker carriage was deﬁ ned as culture-negative pre-shift 
nasal screen preceding culture-positive post-shift screen 
on day one, followed by culture-negative screen on day 
two.15 We did not account for missing samples or failure 
in whole-genome sequencing. We used medians, IQR, 
and rank-sum tests to compare continuous data and exact 
tests to compare categorical data.
Role of the funding source
The funder of the study had no role in study design, data 
collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of 
the report. The corresponding author had full access to 
all the data in the study and had ﬁ nal responsibility for 
the decision to submit for publication.
Results
Of 208 eligible health-care workers, 198 (95%) consented to 
participate in the study. 73 (37%) were S aureus nasal carriers 
at enrolment, of whom eight (4%) carried MRSA (table). 
During the study, 115 (58%) health-care workers yielded 
S aureus at least once from nasal swabs. Nasal carriage rates 
at any timepoint were similar among nurses, doctors, and 
physiotherapists (p=0·50) and at 4-weekly sampling 
intervals (median 36·9%, IQR 35·7–37·3; appendix p 12).
Panel: Salient features of infection control and antimicrobial stewardship practice 
during the study period
Hand hygiene and nursing practice
• Hand hygiene with alcohol gel or soap and water, with adherence to WHO 
Five Moments For Hand Hygiene for all staﬀ  and visitors
• Monthly audits of hand hygiene practice reported to infection prevention committee 
of Hospital Trust 
• Compliance with dress code (including bare below elbows and no wrist watches) to 
facilitate hand hygiene
• Aseptic non-touch technique to reduce contamination of wounds and devices
• Nurse-to-patient ratio maintained at 1:1 for ventilated patients and 1:2 for other patients
Meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) surveillance and isolation
• MRSA screening (nose plus groin or throat and any wound) for all patients admitted to 
the hospital
• All patients in critical care had additional MRSA screening on admission to the intensive 
care unit (ICU) or high-dependency unit (HDU), weekly thereafter, and at discharge
• Patients known to be MRSA positive at ICU or HDU admission were nursed in 
single-room accommodation or with bed-side precautions (gown and gloves) until 
single-room accommodation became available (with priority for patients with 
exfoliating skin conditions, large open wounds, MRSA in sputum, or tracheostomy)
• Patients found to be MRSA positive after ICU or HDU admission were nursed in 
single-room accommodation or with bed-side precautions (gown and gloves) until 
single-room accommodation became available
• Health-care workers were not routinely screened
S aureus suppression
• All patients received skin washes with 4% chlorhexidine gluconate aqueous solution
• Patients who were MRSA positive additionally received nasal mupirocin (2%)
Environmental cleaning and decontamination
• Routine daily cleaning of environmental surfaces with chlorine-releasing solution
• Removal of dust from horizontal surfaces
• Mattresses and beds cleaned daily or if visibly contaminated with chlorhexidine 
wipes (2%)
• Terminal cleaning of patient environment
• Disposable curtains changed between patients
Antimicrobial stewardship
• A Trust-wide policy was in place that minimised inappropriate or excessive antibiotic 
therapy and prophylaxis, and limited use of glycopeptides, third-generation 
cephalosporins, and quinolones
• Selective digestive decontamination was not used 
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Longitudinal data were available for 191 health-care 
workers who returned a median of ten (range 2–15) nasal 
swabs taken every 4 weeks. Three patterns of nasal carriage 
were observed (ﬁ gure 1). 82 (43%) health-care workers 
were always culture negative, 36 (19%) were always culture 
positive (31 with a single subtype), and 73 (38%) were 
intermittently culture positive (59 with a single subtype).
In the substudy to assess the sensitivity of nasal swabbing 
for detection of carriage at any anatomical site, 45 (37%) of 
122 nurses were culture positive by nasal swab, 61 (50%) 
were culture positive when throat swabs were included, 
and 64 (52%) were culture positive when all body sites 
were included. Hence, the sensitivity of nasal swabbing 
was 70·3% (95% CI 57·6–81·1).
To assess whether nursing staﬀ  acquire S aureus carriage 
transiently following patient contact, 103 nurses had nasal 
swabs before and after a shift on day one and before a shift 
on day two. Concordance of culture results between swabs 
was 98%. Transient nasal acquisition was not detected.
In total, 937 S aureus isolates were obtained from 
health-care workers during the study, and whole-genome 
sequencing was successfully done for 902 (96%) of these 
isolates (appendix p 6). 242 (86%) of 281 re presentative 
median within-host SNV diﬀ erences were fewer than 40, 
indicating the presence of a single subtype across 
diﬀ erent anatomical sites and over time (ﬁ gure 2; 
appendix p 7). The median of the remaining within-host 
SNV diﬀ erences (>40) was more than 10 000 and all were 
at least 75 SNVs apart, indicating subtypes separated by 
more than 9 years of evolutionary time and consistent 
with infection by more than one subtype across 
anatomical sites or over time. By contrast with low 
within-host diversity, the strains of S aureus carried by 
diﬀ erent health-care workers were predominantly 
distinct from each other (ﬁ gure 3). 26 (20%) of 133 isolates 
diﬀ ered from another health-care worker isolate by fewer 
than 40 SNVs, and most of these were within ﬁ ve SNVs, 
suggesting recent transmission between health-care 
workers or acquisition in both health-care workers from 
a common source. Over the 14 month study period, we 
detected 69 S aureus acquisitions involving 54 (28%) of 
191 health-care workers. Acquisition was deﬁ ned by 
change of colonisation status from culture negative to 
culture positive for 40 acquisitions and change of subtype 
for 29 acquisitions (table).
2153 environmental samples (1981 from bed spaces, 
15 from the blood gas machine, and 157 from the air) were 
taken from 40 locations (28 bed spaces, one blood gas 
machine, and 11 air sampling sites) during the study. 
S aureus was identiﬁ ed in the environment at every 
4-weekly sampling timepoint (appendix p 12), with 
8% (two of 26) to 39% (11 of 28) of bed space samples and 
9–50% (1–5 of ten) of air samples yielding a total of 
178 S aureus isolates (23 of which were MRSA). The 
genetic diversity of environmental isolates across the 
study was bimodal. 107 (60%) of 178 isolates were within 
40 SNVs of another environmental isolate (of which 
81 [76%] of 107 were within one SNV), whereas 71 (40%) of 
178 isolates were more than 100 SNVs (predominantly 
>1000 SNVs) apart (ﬁ gure 3).
During the study, 1933 admissions (involving 
1760 patients) to the ICU and HDU were recorded, 
 Nurses
(n=149)
Doctors
(n=40)
Physiotherapists 
(n=9)
Total health-care workers 
(n=198)
Patient admissions 
(n=1933)
Age, years
16–29 40 (27%) 9 (23%) 8 (89%) 57 (29%) 154 (8%)
30–39 71 (48%) 17 (43%) 1 (11%) 89 (45%) 150 (8%)
40–49 28 (19%) 11 (28%) 0 39 (20%) 208 (11%)
50–59 9 (6%) 3 (8%) 0 12 (6%) 264 (14%)
≥60 1 (1%) 0 0 1 (1%) 1157 (60%)
Male sex 25 (17%) 24 (60%) 2 (22%) 51 (26%) 1164 (60%)
Nasal carriage at enrolment 54 (36%) 16 (40%) 3 (33%) 73 (37%) 386* (21%)
MRSA 8 (5%) 0 0 8 (4%) 39 (2%)
Total acquisitions of S aureus during study 60 5 4 69 97
MRSA 3 (5%) 0 1 (25%) 4 (6%) 19 (20%)
Culture negative to positive acquisitions 
during study
31 5 4 40 68
MRSA 0 0 1 (25%) 1 (3%) 14 (21%)
Culture positive to new subtype acquisitions 
during study
29 0 0 29 29
MRSA 3 (10%) 0 0 3 (10%) 5 (17%)
Acquisition isolates available for 
whole-genome sequencing
59 (98%) 5 (100%) 4 (100%) 68 (99%) 86 (89%)
Data are n (%) or n. MRSA=meticillin-resistant S aureus. *Of 1854 patients receiving at least one screen.
Table: Identiﬁ cation of Staphylococcus aureus in health-care workers and patients admitted to the intensive care and high-dependency unit
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including 20 patients who were already in the ICU or 
HDU at study initiation, 1889 admitted and discharged, 
and 24 remaining in the ICU or HDU at study end. 
Median length of stay was 3·0 days (IQR 1·6–6·0), and 
median age was 65·5 years (IQR 48·8–76·6). 1164 (60%) 
admissions involved male patients. 1854 (96%) of 
1933 admissions were screened at least once for S aureus 
in the ICU or HDU (appendix p 13), and 1784 (92%) were 
screened within 24 h of admission. 41 (52%) of 
79 unscreened admissions involved patients who had 
been in the ICU or HDU for 24 h or less. 1127 (61%) 
admissions were sampled serially (median two [range 2–32] 
screens per admission).
At admission to the ICU or HDU, 386 (21%) of 
1854 screened admissions carried S aureus, of whom 
39 (2%) carried MRSA (table). 357 (20%) of 1784 patients 
swabbed within 24 h of admission were culture positive, 
and 12 (17%) of 70 patients whose ﬁ rst swab was taken 
within 24–48 h of admission were culture positive; an 
additional 17 patients yielded S aureus from diagnostic 
samples taken within 48 h of admission but had 
culture-negative swabs at admission screening. Patients 
admitted to the ICU or HDU within 24 h of hospital 
admission were more likely to yield S aureus from ICU 
and HDU admission screens (taken ≤24 h) than were 
patients admitted to ICU or HDU more than 24 h after 
hospital admission (269 [24%] of 1131 vs 88 [13%] of 653, 
p<0·0001). Most strains of S aureus carried by diﬀ erent 
patients were distinct (ﬁ gure 3). However, 56 (14%) of 
409 patient isolates were fewer than 40 SNVs apart from 
another patient isolate, suggesting possible involvement 
in recent transmission networks.
Among 1127 patient admissions sampled on more than 
one occasion, 92 (8%) acquired S aureus while in the ICU 
or HDU. A total of 97 S aureus acquisitions were detected, 
of which 68 were from culture negative to culture positive 
(in 67 patients) and 29 were new subtype acquisitions (in 
26 patients, including one who newly acquired; table). 
20 acquisitions were identiﬁ ed from diagnostic samples, 
of which three were from bloodstream infections.
In total, 605 subtypes of S aureus were identiﬁ ed during 
the study. A median of 38 (IQR 34–42) new subtypes was 
detected per 4-weekly cycle (excluding the ﬁ rst 4 weeks 
when most health-care workers were recruited; ﬁ gure 4). 
The median SNV diﬀ erence between subtypes across the 
whole study was 273 (IQR 162–399, range 42–18 171), 
corresponding to roughly 34–35 years of evolution. The 
distribution of subtype sizes is shown on appendix p 8. 
12 isolates identiﬁ ed using conventional methods as 
S aureus were identiﬁ ed with whole-genome sequencing 
as Staphylococcus argenteus (appendix).
Although 17 (10%) of 169 subtypes identiﬁ ed in 
health-care workers were also identiﬁ ed in patients, only 
seven fulﬁ lled criteria for transmission from health-care 
worker to patient—ie, the newly acquired patient subtype 
was identiﬁ ed in a health-care worker before or at the 
same time as the patient (ﬁ gure 4; appendix pp 9–10). 
These seven transmissions involved six health-care 
workers. Five were transmissions of MSSA, and two 
were of MRSA from the same health-care worker. In the 
remaining ten matches, four patient isolates at ICU or 
HDU admission had the same subtype previously found 
Figure 1: Nasal colonisation of Staphylococcus aureus in 191 serially screened health-care workers
Each dot represents culture results of 4-weekly nasal swabs. MRSA=meticillin-resistant S aureus. 
MSSA=meticillin-susceptible S aureus.
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in a health-care worker, suggesting acquisition from a 
common source outside the unit, and six isolates were 
identiﬁ ed in the patients before they were ﬁ rst identiﬁ ed 
in health-care workers, suggesting transmission from 
patients to health-care workers.
Although 30 (34%) of 88 environmental subtypes were 
also found in patients, only two were found in the 
environment and then acquired by a patient (appendix p 11). 
One subtype was found in a patient at the time of ICU or 
HDU admission, and the remainder were found in the 
environment only after they had been identiﬁ ed in 
patients, suggesting shedding into the environment.
Of the 416 subtypes found in patients, 27 were identiﬁ ed 
in more than one patient. For 14 subtypes, there were 
16 acquisitions where a subtype present or previously 
present in one patient was acquired by another patient, in 
addition to the transmissions from health-care workers 
and the environment (ﬁ gure 4; appendix p 10). Eight 
instances where two patients shared the same subtype at 
the time of ICU or HDU admission were recorded, 
including six instances where patients had separate ICU or 
HDU admissions, suggesting a common source outside 
the unit. For ﬁ ve subtypes, there were six acquisitions 
where a donor was not identiﬁ ed. Overall, a donor could be 
identiﬁ ed in 25 (26%) of 97 patient acquisitions.
Discussion
We have exhaustively investigated S aureus transmission 
in an ICU and an HDU where standard UK infection 
control measures were in place. We sampled health-care 
workers, the environment, and patients and used whole-
genome sequencing to determine the genetic relatedness 
of isolates. Using a threshold of 40 SNVs (equivalent to 
roughly 5 years of evolution) to deﬁ ne genetic subtypes, 
we detected 605 genetically distinct subtypes separated by 
a median of 273 SNVs, equating to roughly 34 years of 
evolution. Strikingly, although a third of health-care 
workers carried S aureus, only seven instances of 
transmission from health-care worker to patient were 
detected. S aureus was also widely present in the 
environment, but we only detected two instances of 
patient acquisition from the environment. Consistent 
with results from our previous study,8 we also detected 
some instances of patient-to-patient transmission.
Health-care workers might contribute to nosocomial 
transmission of S aureus as a reservoir or as vectors. 
Patient acquisition of S aureus has been associated with 
overcrowding, understaﬃ  ng,16,17 and close patient 
contact.16,18 Before the development of whole-genome 
sequencing, conventional typing and epidemiological 
approaches had implicated health-care workers in 
nosocomial transmission of S aureus, particularly in 
MRSA outbreaks.15,19–24 Two published sequencing-based 
studies9,25 included health-care workers in investigation 
of neonatal S aureus outbreaks. Harris and colleagues9 
implicated a health-care worker colonised with MRSA in 
an outbreak that persisted despite environmental 
cleaning. By contrast, although Roisin and colleagues25 
identiﬁ ed a health-care worker colonised with an 
outbreak MSSA strain, sequencing analysis suggested 
acquisition during the outbreak rather than transmission 
from health-care worker to patient. Using whole-genome 
sequencing, we assembled a uniquely comprehensive 
picture of S aureus colonisation and transmission in a 
Figure 3: Genomic diversity of Staphylococcus aureus isolates obtained from health-care workers, 
environmental samples, and patients
Minimum SNVs between isolates taken from diﬀ erent health-care workers, between environmental isolates and 
any other environmental isolate cultured in the same month, and between diﬀ erent patients. Each dot represents 
the SNV diﬀ erence between two isolates. HCW=health-care workers. SNVs=single-nucleotide variants.
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Figure 2: Within-host diversity of Staphylococcus aureus in health-care workers
Median SNV diﬀ erences between pairs of nasal isolates cultured 24 h apart and 1 month apart, and between 
multiple body sites at the same timepoint. Maximum SNV diﬀ erences in nasal isolates during the entire study. 
Each dot represents the SNV between two isolates cultured from each health-care worker, and the median is 
shown when more than one pair was available for each health-care worker. HCW=health-care workers. 
SNVs=single-nucleotide variants.
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well deﬁ ned high-dependency clinical setting. We 
showed the presence of highly diverse strains and 
continuous ingress of new subtypes into the unit rather 
than ongoing transmission of strains between health-care 
workers, the environment, and patients.
Our study has limitations. It was done in a single 
hospital, and our ﬁ ndings might not be generalisable to all 
locations. However, our study setting is likely to be typical, 
in terms of risk factors for S aureus transmission,3 of high-
dependency care settings elsewhere. Since the median 
length of stay was short (3 days), 806 (42%) of 1193 patient 
admissions were omitted from secondary screening and 
could not be assessed for acquisition. However, trans-
mission from health-care workers or the environment to 
this subset of patients would need to be disproportionately 
large to change our ﬁ ndings. We inferred transmission 
from health-care worker to patient in two instances where 
they acquired the same subtype of S aureus in the same 
month. However, since health-care workers were screened 
every 4 weeks, transmission from patient to health-care 
worker is an alternative interpretation. Because the 
sensitivity of nasal screening is imperfect, we might have 
underestimated colonisation rates in patients and health-
care workers. Our 4-weekly sampling interval for health-
care workers could have missed some transient carriage, 
although the carriage patterns we observed were strikingly 
consistent. We also staggered recruitment of diﬀ erent 
groups of health-care workers, starting with nurses in view 
of their high patient contact, followed by doctors and 
physiotherapists after successful study implementation. 
Nevertheless, our method represents the reality of clinical 
practice; even if some transmissions from health-care 
workers to patients were not detected, such additional 
carriage would have to account for a substantial and 
disproportionate number of transmissions to change our 
fundamental observation—namely, in the context of good 
infection control, patients are not at high risk of S aureus 
acquisition, despite the substantial burden of S aureus 
detected in health-care workers, the environment, and 
patients.
The high genetic diversity and low level of transmission 
we observed contrast strikingly with ﬁ ndings from studies 
in low-income settings with lower barriers to transmission, 
in which multiple transmissions of small numbers of 
strains have been documented.26 Our ﬁ ndings therefore 
underscore the eﬀ ectiveness and importance of measures 
implemented to prevent nosocomial transmission.
Despite intensive sampling, only 25 (26%) of 97 patient 
acquisitions in our study could be linked to putative 
donors. The lower carriage rates for patients compared 
with health-care workers suggest that a substantial 
proportion of suspected acquisitions might not actually 
be true acquisitions. Low levels of colonisation 
(eg, following antibiotic exposure) might result in a 
false-negative admission screen. Some acquisitions 
might thus represent recrudescence from cryptic 
(eg, intracellular27) foci rather than relative insensitivity 
of screening by swabbing mucosal surfaces. Additional 
explanations for unattributed acquisitions include 
unsampled putative sources such as visitors to the ICU 
or HDU and the food chain.
To conclude, in the presence of robust infection control 
measures, the critical care setting is characterised by 
genetically diverse and continually changing patterns of 
S aureus colonisation of patients, staﬀ  members, and the 
environment, but transmission to patients occurs 
Figure 4: Introduction and source of new Staphylococcus aureus subtypes over time
The rarefaction curve shows newly identiﬁ ed subtypes (n=605) over time. The ﬁ rst isolate from each subtype and 
source is plotted according to the date of collection. Where a subtype was retrieved from more than one of the 
same source (ie, more than one patient or health-care worker), multiple dots of the same colour are plotted. 
Horizontal lines joining dots of the same subtype are coloured according to the source where each subtype was 
ﬁ rst identiﬁ ed. The Venn diagram shows sources of individual subtypes identiﬁ ed during the study.
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infrequently. Therefore, use of additional measures to 
reduce S aureus colonisation of health-care workers and 
the environment might provide little extra protection to 
patients in a non-outbreak situation.
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